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ABSTRACT 
 
Two studies were performed to test whether abstract concepts are grounded in 
experience and activate introspective/linguistic information. In Study 1, four groups of 
participants, each with different expertise in the domain of safety and security at the 
workplace (S&S), defined abstract concepts belonging to the S&S domain and differing in 
degree of abstractness. The definitions included mainly situations, confirming grounding of 
abstract concepts. In Study 2 the task was performed by students with no experience of S&S. 
The definitions were modulated by participants’ expertise; the role of introspection increased 
with more abstract concepts. Results support embodied theories on abstract concepts. 
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How abstract is risk for workers?  
Expertise, context and introspection in abstract concepts 
 
Introduction 
 
For many years the study of abstract concepts, as “freedom” and “justice”, has been 
almost completely overlooked in research on conceptual knowledge. However, abstraction 
represents one of the most sophisticated capabilities of our species. Providing an explanation 
of abstract concepts is therefore important, and it is even crucial for theories of embodied and 
grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008; Borghi & Caruana, 2015). It is namely much easier for 
an embodied view to explain the representation of concepts as “table”, the referent of which 
is an easily perceivable object, than of abstract concepts such as “friendship” and “cause”. 
Importantly, concrete and abstract concepts are not dichotomously opposed; they are rather 
distributed along a continuum ranging from very concrete to very abstract concepts.  
The great variability of abstract concepts renders it quite difficult to find a theoretical 
framework that accounts for them all. In recent years different approaches inspired by 
embodied and grounded (EG) cognition have sought to explain how abstract concepts are 
represented (for reviews see Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi et al., under review; Pecher et 
al., 2011). All these approaches share the view that abstract concepts arise from simulation 
processes: in order to understand and correctly use them, one needs to form a simulation 
recruiting the same sensorimotor system involved while experiencing their referent. The first 
and more influential one is based on metaphors (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and is 
supported by evidence showing that abstract concepts are represented in terms of concrete 
concepts. For example, the abstract concept of time is based on that of space (e.g., Casasanto 
& Boroditsky, 2008; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), and abstract notions such as God and 
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Evil are linked to vertical metaphors (Meier et al., 2007). A second approach relates abstract 
words to actions. So, for example, judging the sensibility of sentences describing the transfer 
of concrete objects or abstract information requires less time when the action implied by the 
sentence matches the action required to make the response (action–sentence compatibility 
effect, or ACE, Glenberg et al., 2008). According to a further recent view, emotions play a 
major role for abstract concepts representation (AEA, Affective embodiment account: Kousta 
et al., 2011; Vigliocco et al. 2014). According to the situational and introspective view 
(Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), while both concrete and abstract 
concepts are grounded in situations, situations can be even more crucial for abstract concepts. 
Abstract concepts are associated with a wider variety of situations than concrete concepts, 
and, while concrete concepts attention focuses primarily on objects with background 
situations, abstract concepts lead to focusing attention primarily on events, on social aspects, 
and on introspective aspects of situations. For example, the concept ‘consequence’ is related 
to situations involving a preceding event and introspective processes (see Barsalou & 
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Setti & Caramelli, 2005; Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001; Wiemer-
Hastings & Xu, 2005; Wiemer-Hastings & Graesser, 2000). Adopting this approach has the 
advantage to account for the variety of abstract concepts and to explain why, for example, the 
concept ‘principle’ is evaluated as more abstract than ‘idea’. Situations can vary in the 
constraints they exert on concepts, so that the less and the more abstract  the situational 
constraints (e.g. causal, temporal, and spatial) are, the more abstract a concept is. 
In our view the most important novelty in the last years is the emergence of multiple 
representation approaches, according to which not only sensorimotor but also linguistic 
experience plays a role in shaping abstract concepts representation (Dove, 2011, 2014; 
Borghi & Binkofski, 2014). We will here focus on the WAT (Words As social Tools) view 
(Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014) which proposes that both sensorimotor 
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and linguistic experience concur in representing abstract and concrete concepts, but that they 
are differently distributed. Since abstract concepts do not refer to concrete and clearly 
bounded objects but to an heterogeneous variety of situations and states, and since their 
members are more sparse and diverse than members of concrete categories, language is more 
critical for their acquisition. Linguistic labels can namely work as a glue helping us to collect 
such a sparse variety of experiences, and the reactivation of linguistic experience is more 
crucial for abstract concepts representation than for concrete ones. In support of this 
hypothesis, behavioral and TMS studies have demonstrated that processing of abstract 
concepts activates linguistic information and involves the mouth effector in absence of 
explicit speech (e.g., Borghi et al., 2011; Ghio et al., 2013; Gleitman et al., 2005; Granito et 
al., 2015; Scorolli et al., 2011; 2012; Wauters et al., 2003) and fMRI studies have shown 
clear involvement of areas related to language production and comprehension during abstract 
concepts processing, as the left inferior frontal gyrus and the left middle temporal gyrus 
(Binder et al., 2009; Hoffman et al., 2015; Sakreida et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2010). 
According to WAT, the involvement of language and of the mouth is due either to the 
activation of the linguistically mediated acquisition experience, or to the use of a form of 
inner language helping to re-explain to oneself the meaning of the word, or to both processes 
(Borghi & Binkofski, 2014). 
In this theoretical framework, this study aims to investigate whether abstract concepts 
are grounded in experiences, i.e. whether they evoke specific contexts and are modulated by 
participants’ expertise, and whether they evoke also linguistic/introspective elements.  
A specific abstract domain, that of safety and security (S&S) at the workplace, was 
selected. Four groups of participants with different working experience in this domain - 
managers, security-technicians, trade union delegates, and factory workers - were asked to 
define three abstract concepts belonging to the chosen domain, i.e. ‘risk’, ‘danger’ and 
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‘prevention’. The choice of focusing on only three concepts, while possibly limiting the 
generalization of the results to wider sets of abstract concepts, allows us to better explore the 
effect of expertise on a specific domain, that of S&S at the workplace.  
The definitions produced were parsed in order to code the conceptual relations 
produced. We distinguished situational, introspective, taxonomic, and attributive relations 
(Study 1). As the 4 groups of participants in Study 1 were directly involved in the specific 
domain, i.e. S&S at the workplace, in Study 2 we tested lay participants (university students) 
who would not directly associate the concepts to workplace situations, but  to more general 
everyday situations.  
The following hypotheses were advanced: 
1) Grounding of abstract concepts in situations. We hypothesize that  abstract concepts are 
grounded in sensorimotor systems and in experiences, similarly to concrete objects. Since 
abstract concepts do not have concrete and bounded objects as referents, we predict that the 
definitions provided by the four groups of professionals (managers, security-technicians, 
trade union delegates, and workers) yield situational information more than any other type of 
information.  
2) Effects of expertise. If abstract concepts are grounded in experience, then the effect 
of expertise, well documented in concrete items, should also be found in abstract concepts. 
Medin et al. (1997) have shown that taxonomists, landscape workers, and park maintenance 
personnel categorize concrete items such as trees differently, as their expertise derives from 
focusing on different aspects of trees. To our knowledge the only attempt to study how 
expertise modulates abstract concepts was accomplished by Roversi et al. (2013) who 
showed with a feature production task that students, law graduate and law professionals 
differently conceptualize law concepts. However, the results on expertise of this study were 
preliminary, and pertained only the law domain. In the present study we intend to test 
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whether people with different expertise differently organize their knowledge of a specific 
domain. If abstract concepts are grounded in experience, we predict that situational 
components characterize abstract conceptual knowledge of all groups. Beside this, we expect 
that the definitions provided by the four groups of participants differ with regard to the other 
components: specifically, we predict that introspective components characterize conceptual 
organization of workers and delegates, who have a direct “embodied” experience of the S&S 
domain, while taxonomic components should be more relevant for managers and technicians, 
who have a declarative knowledge of the domain. We expect students to show mainly, but 
not only, declarative knowledge because this kind of knowledge meets the requirements for 
academic performance they are used to.  
3) Introspective components. If abstract concepts have a graded structure, then, the 
definitions of more abstract concepts should rest more on abstract contextual constraints. In 
particular, we predict that more abstract concepts elicit primarily abstract components, such 
as the introspective ones (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005), likely produced through some 
forms of inner talk, aimed at explaining to oneself the meaning of the concept (Borghi & 
Binkofski, 2014). Less abstract concepts should instead primarily activate more concrete 
contextual components, such as situations, locations, agents’ characteristics, relations 
between entities, and temporal sequences.  
To test these hypotheses, an oral definition task was chosen, in which participants 
were asked to define the three abstract concepts ‘risk’, ‘danger’ and ‘prevention’ belonging to 
the domain of S&S.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 4 groups of 20 experts each. Each group was characterized by a 
specific type of expertise in the domain of  ‘S&S’ at workplace. They were: 
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-  managers, who had very good formal, i.e. theoretical knowledge of the domain but 
no direct experience;  
- security-technicians, who had good domain knowledge on both theoretical and direct 
experience grounds;  
- trade union delegates, who were trained specifically on S&S in a mechanical 
industry working place; 
- workers, who had no theoretical knowledge of the domain, but daily direct 
experience of  possible conditions endangering S&S.  
Materials  
The materials consisted of the three abstract concepts ‘risk’, ‘danger’, and 
‘prevention’. These concepts were selected because they are of paramount relevance in the 
specific domain of S&S at workplace as well as in many domains in everyday life and, 
consequently, they are very familiar not only to the four chosen professional groups, but to 
non-professionals as well.  
A preliminary study was performed to assess whether the three chosen nouns differed 
in their abstractness degree. Following Wiemer-Hastings et al. (2001), the degree of 
abstractness of concepts depends on the constraints of the situation in which they occur. Due 
to its prescriptive character, the concept ‘prevention’ should refer to well identified and 
detailed procedures that can be realized in specific and well-defined locations at workplaces. 
Instead, due to their generic denotation, both ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ can be supposed to refer to 
possible situations the realization of which depends on future events. Thus, the concept 
‘prevention’ was expected to be less abstract than both ‘risk’ and ‘danger’. 
Pre-test on materials  
In order to pre-test the material, 12 filler concepts (3 artifacts, 3 natural kinds, 3 
emotion concepts, and 3 temporal concepts) were added to ‘risk’, ‘danger’ and ‘prevention’.  
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An independent sample of 40 students at the University of Bologna was presented 
with the set of the 15 concepts thus obtained written on a sheet of paper in random order. 
They were asked to rate the abstractness degree of each concept on a 7 points scale (1 
meaning extremely concrete concept and 7 extremely abstract concept).  
 The ANOVA performed on the abstractness ratings with ‘risk’, ‘danger’, and 
‘prevention’ as the independent variable showed a significant difference between the 
concepts (F (2,78) = 7.21, MSe = 1.61, p <.01) due to ‘prevention’ (M = 3.9) being rated as 
significantly (post-hoc test Newman-Keuls, p <.01) more concrete  than both ‘risk’ (M = 4.7) 
and ‘danger’ (M = 4.9), which did not differ from each other. The reason why the 
abstractness value is not so far from the midpoint of the scale is due to the fact that the 3 
terms were included in a larger set of concepts, ranging from very concrete to very abstract 
ones, and to the fact that one participant used the value 1 for all the three considered 
concepts. In sum we predict an effect of expertise that will differentiate the groups on the 
kind of components produced. Based on the abstractness ratings we also expect that the 
definitions of both the concepts ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ should rest on introspective components, 
which characterize high abstractness degree concepts, more than those of the lower 
abstractness-degree concept ‘prevention’. 
Procedure  
Each participant was interviewed individually for about 30 minutes by a researcher on 
the topic of safety and security at workplaces for a general survey on their opinions. At the 
beginning of the session, each participant was asked: "How would you define ‘X’?" for each 
of the three concepts (‘risk’, ‘danger’, and ‘prevention’). The definitions, as well as the 
subsequent interviews, which are not analysed in this study, were tape-recorded. The three 
definitions provided at the beginning of the interview were transcribed and coded for data 
analysis in this study.  
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Results 
Coding  
Once transcribed, the definitions were parsed into components to be coded separately. 
The parsing criteria used were the following (see Borghi & Barsalou, 2001):  
a) nouns and modifiers were coded separately only when the modifier directly 
referred to the concept (e.g., 'full of' was coded independently of its noun 'danger'). 
Otherwise, they were coded together (e.g., 'dirty factory'); 
b) verbs and their arguments were coded separately (e.g., ‘wear’ was coded 
independently of its argument ‘helmet’).They were coded together only when the argument 
had a default value (e.g., ‘in order to prevent something’, where ‘something’ has a default 
value). 
The components thus obtained were distinguished into four types:  
1. Situational components that included: space (physical and situation settings, e.g., 
‘in the factory’, ‘at work’); time (e.g., ‘yesterday’); action and instrument (e.g., ‘in order to 
press’, ‘with a hammer’);  
2. Introspective components (Wu & Barsalou, 2009) that included: ego involvement 
(e.g., ‘it happened to me’); emotions (e.g., ‘I am scared when…’); intentional states (e.g., ’I 
believe that… ’); cognitive processes (e.g., ‘it requires attention’);     
3. Taxonomic components that included: superordinate (e.g., ‘risk’ – ‘an unsafe 
situation’); coordinate, i.e. synonyms and exemplifications,  (e.g., ‘risk’ – ‘danger’); and 
subordinate (e.g., ‘risk’ - ‘fire’) components;  
4. Attributive components that included mainly evaluations (e.g., ‘prevention is 
good’).  
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Two researchers independently coded the definitions produced by the four groups of 
participants. The degree of agreement between them was 95.4%. Cases of disagreement were 
solved after brief discussion.  
 We performed two analyses one on the whole set of definitions produced by all 
participants and the other on the definitions obtained from the four groups of participants. 
The first analysis assessed which components were elicited by each concept, i.e. whether the 
3 abstract concepts considered were grounded in situations and what components 
characterized them depending on their abstractness. The second analysis  assessed the effect 
of expertise by contrasting the definitions obtained from the four groups of participants  
Chi square analyses and Correspondence Analyses were performed on the data. 
Correspondence Analyses were performed when there comprised at least six groups of 
frequencies, three for each group of variables, necessary to define the coordinates of the 
points on the graph. In Correspondence Analysis, based on the Chi square test, the 
frequencies of the relations produced give rise to a broad data matrix allowing for the 
identification of their weight and their graphical representation as points in a 
multidimensional space. On the graph, the geometrical proximity of the points shows the 
degree of their association and the similarity of their distribution (Greenacre & Blasius, 1994) 
. The first dimension explains a Total Inertia higher than that explained by the further 
dimensions. The maximum number of dimensions is the minimum between the number of 
columns minus 1 and the number of rows minus 1.  
In this study Correspondence Analysis helped in highlighting whether, and if so 
which, specific components characterized each concept. The first dimension was always 
discussed because it explained most of the variance, while the second one was discussed only 
when it explained more than 10% of the variance (for use of Correspondence Analysis in a 
similar production task see Roversi et al., 2013).  
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Finally, in order to compare the results of Study 1 to those obtained in Study 2, a log-
linear analysis was performed on the frequencies of the components produced by participants 
in the two Studies. 
Analysis on the components of the whole set of definitions  
As hypothesized, the situational components were the most frequently produced 
amounting to 80% of the total number of the components produced. The production of 
taxonomic, introspective and attributive components amounted respectively to 12%, 5%, and 
3% (Fig. 1.). 
 
Fig. 1.  Total production percentages for each component (Study 1). 
 
 
 
These results clearly showed that, in defining abstract concepts, participants mainly 
activated situational components. Thus, the first hypothesis was verified. 
In order to further assess whether, and if so how, the concepts ‘prevention’, ‘risk’ and 
‘danger’ were characterized by different types of components, a Correspondence Analysis 
was performed. This analysis allowed the assessment of the specific components that 
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distinguished the three concepts. The factors of the Correspondence Analysis were the three 
abstract concepts and the types of the components elicited (Fig. 2.). 
 
Fig. 2. Correspondence analysis with the 3 S&S domain abstract concepts and their 
definitional components as factors (Study 1). 
 
 
On the first dimension, explaining 92% of the total variance, the concept ‘prevention’ 
that yielded definitions based on taxonomic components, i.e. coordinates, differed from both 
‘risk’ and ‘danger’ that yielded definitions based on both introspective and attributive 
components. As the second dimension explained only 8% of the variance, we do not discuss 
it. The situational components, which were the most frequently produced, had no weight in 
this analysis as they characterized the definitions of the three concepts equally well. 
These results suggest that, while all concepts yielded definitions based on situations, 
the three concepts differed in the remaining components. The definition of ‘prevention’, 
which was rated as less abstract than both ‘risk’ and ‘danger’, was characterized by 
taxonomic components, given by examples, i.e. instructions to be given in situations where 
‘prevention’ usually occurs. Instead, the definitions of  ‘risk’ and ‘danger’, which were rated 
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as more abstract than ‘prevention’, were characterized by both introspective and attributive 
components, e.g. ‘scary’, that refer to abstract, unobservable elements of the situations.  
Analysis on the definitions produced by each group of experts 
Overall, the definitions produced by the four groups of professionals differed with 
regard to the number of components: 32% of the components were produced by workers; 
28% by security-technicians, 21% by managers  and 19% by delegates. This means that, due 
to their direct experience of the situations in which the three concepts occur, workers and 
security-technicians’ definitions were richer than those provided by managers and delegates 
whose knowledge of the concepts is less linked to direct experiences.  
The frequencies of the different components elicited by the three concepts were 
analyzed in the definitions provided by each of the four groups of professionals’. Across the 
four groups, situational components were produced more frequently than taxonomic ones that 
were the second most frequently produced components (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Percentage of the types of components produced by each group of 
professionals.  
 Workers Managers Technicians Delegates 
situational comp. 81 80 80 79 
taxonomic comp. 8 14 17 11 
introspect. comp. 7 2 2 7 
attrib. comp. 4 4 1 2 
 
 In order to assess whether the four groups differed in the components used depending on 
their specific expertise, a Correspondence Analysis was performed with the four groups of 
participants and the types of the components produced as factors (Fig 3.). 
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Fig. 3. Correspondence analysis with the 4 groups of participants and the types of the 
definitional components produced as factors (Study 1). 
 
On the first dimension, explaining 81% of the variance, workers’ definitions, 
characterized by introspective components, differed from those produced by both managers 
and security-technicians which were characterized by taxonomic components. On the second 
dimension, explaining 19% of the variance, managers’ definitions, characterized by 
attributive components, differed from those produced by delegates, which were characterized 
by introspective components (situational components had no weight in this analysis as they 
characterized the definitions produced by the four groups of experts equally well). 
In order to better understand the role of expertise in producing definitions in the S&S 
domain, we analyzed the definitions at a more fine grained level by combining the three 
concepts and analysis each kind of component separately. Therefore we conducted four 
Correspondence Analysis, one for each component (Situational, Introspective, Taxonomic 
and Properties) with factors the four groups of experts and, in turn, the subcomponents of 
each kind of component. For example for the Correspondence Analysis on the Taxonomic 
components we considered group of experts: managers, security technicians, delegates and 
workers, and the three subcomponents: superordinate, subordinate and coordinate 
components. For situational components managers’ definitions were characterized by 
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situations and process, while workers’ ones were characterized by actions and instrument 
(dim 1, 60% of the variance), security technicians’ definitions referred to patients and space 
(dim 2, 26% of the variance) as opposed to managers’ definitions which referred to causes.  
As to introspective components  managers’ definitions were characterized by cognitive 
processes (dim 1, 57% of the variance), while security technicians definitions were 
characterized by emotions, evaluations and self-involvement; (dim 2, 27% of the variance) 
delegates’ definitions were characterized by emotions and evaluation, while security 
technicians’ definitions were characterized by representations. For taxonomic components, 
workers’ definitions were characterized by subordinates, while security technicians’ 
definitions were characterized by coordinates (dim 1, 91% of the variance); managers’ 
definitions were characterized by superordinate concepts, as opposed to coordinate concepts 
for delegates (dim 2, 9% of the variance). For properties, workers’ definitions were 
characterized by perceptual properties, while managers’ definitions were characterized by 
qualities (one dimension). 
Discussion 
Our results confirm the three predictions advanced.  
As expected, the selected abstract concepts elicited definitions characterized by 
situations. This confirms that abstract concepts, since they do not have objects as referents, 
are grounded in situations.  
While situations were produced by all groups, the different types of expertise in the 
S&S domain influenced the production of the other components. The definitions ofworkers 
and delegates, who directly experience risky and dangerous situations and prevention 
conditions in their daily lives, were characterized by introspective elements. Managers and 
security-technicians, who have mostly a declarative knowledge of the aforementioned 
situations, grounded their definitions not only on situational, but also on taxonomic and, to a 
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lesser extent, attributive components, i.e. evaluations. Within taxonomic relations, workers 
produced more detailed components (subordinate elements), while the level of abstraction 
increased in security technicians and even more in managers (from coordinate to 
superordinate elements). 
The results also showed that, the higher the abstractness degree of the concept, the 
more abstract were the activated components. In fact, the more abstract concept-nouns ‘risk’ 
and ‘danger’ were characterized mainly by introspective and attributive information, i.e. 
personal involvement and evaluations, which characterize the more abstract situational 
constraints (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001). The less abstract concept ‘prevention’ was 
characterized by taxonomic information, probably due to the fact that this information 
consisted mainly in examples of how to avoid dangerous situations. 
 
Study 2 
In Study 1, the participants’ common involvement in S & S at the workplace could 
limit the possibility to generalize the results. Collecting participants’ definitions at their 
workplace could have encouraged their focusing only on situations of a specific type, those 
related to the workplace, whereas the concepts ‘prevention’, ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ refer to a 
wide variety of domains. 
Study 2 was primarily aimed at checking whether the results obtained in Study 1 
could be replicated with lay people, who have both declarative and direct knowledge of 
‘prevention’, ‘ risk’ and ‘danger’ in several different domains such as car-accidents, sports, 
disease etc. and who are unbiased toward the particular domain of workplace. It is possible to 
hypothesize that the same concept referred to many domains activates more abstract 
knowledge than when it is referred to a single, well-defined domain. 
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We hypothesized that the definitions produced should be again characterized by 
situational components. We also expected taxonomic components due to the nature of 
definitions students are used to in their day-to-day academic life. However, we expected the 
introspective components to characterize concepts’ definitions more in this study than in 
Study 1 due to the variety of  contextual settings participants can refer to. The aim of Study 2 
was also to assess whether the link between the abstractness degree of the concepts and the 
production of introspective components could be found with non-professional participants.  
Method 
Participants 
Nineteen students at the University of Bologna volunteered their participation. 
Materials  
The same three abstract concepts (‘risk’, ‘danger’, and ‘prevention’) were used as in 
Study 1. 
Procedure 
The participants were presented with three sheets of paper in random order, one for 
each concept. On each sheet, below the printed concept, there were five blank lines where 
participants had to write their definition of the concept.  
Results 
Two researchers independently transcribed, parsed and coded the participants’ 
productions with the same criteria as in Study 1. They agreed on 97.6% of the items and the 
few cases of disagreement were solved after brief discussion. 
As predicted by the first hypothesis, the situational components were again the most 
frequently produced (68%) followed by the taxonomic (18%) and the introspective (11%) 
components. The attributive components were again very few (3%) (Figure 4.). 
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Fig. 4. Total production percentages for each component (Study 2). 
 
Pair-wise comparisons showed a difference between the more abstract concepts 
‘danger’ and ‘risk’ eliciting definitions based more on the introspective components than the 
less abstract concept ‘prevention’ that elicited definitions based more on the situational 
components [respectively χ2 (1, N =116) = 7.16, p < .007 and χ2 (1, N =110) = 4.5, p < .03]. 
Accordingly, the asymmetry between ‘prevention’ and both ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ was 
replicated. In addition, the introspective components, which refer to more general, abstract 
contextual settings, played a greater role in characterizing the definitions of  more abstract 
concepts such as ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ than those of ‘prevention’. 
In order to check which components better characterized the definitions of each 
concept, a Correspondence Analysis was performed, the factors of which were the three 
concepts and the types of the components produced (Figure 5.). 
 
Fig. 5. Correspondence analysis with the 3 S&S domain abstract concepts and their 
definitional components as factors (Study 2). 
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On the first dimension, which explained 99% of the total variance, ‘prevention’ 
characterized by the situational components differed from both ‘risk’ and ‘danger’, which 
were characterized by introspective, taxonomic, and attributive components. Accordingly, the 
more concrete components, i.e. the situational ones, characterized the definition of the less 
abstract concept, i.e. prevention. Instead, the more abstract components, in particular the 
introspective ones, characterized the definitions of the more abstract concepts, i.e. ‘risk’ and 
‘danger’. Thus, even if the definitions produced by non-professionals again rested mainly on 
the situational components, the hypothesis that the variety of domains referred to by concepts 
definitions increases the role played by the more abstract components in definitions was 
confirmed.  
Discussion 
Overall, the results of Study 2 with lay participants replicated those obtained in 
Study 1, even if there was an interesting difference. As in Study 1, in Study 2 the 
definitions produced activated mainly situational components. However, in this study the 
situational components characterized primarily the definitions of the less abstract concept 
‘prevention’, whereas in Study 1 situational components were not differentially activated 
by the three concepts. As in Study 1, the more abstract introspective components better 
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characterized the more abstract concepts ‘risk’ and ‘danger’.   
Thus, the asymmetry in the three concepts  in eliciting definitions based on different 
components, already found in Study 1 due to the abstractness degree of the concepts, was 
replicated in Study 2, but differently.  
Comparison between Study 1 and Study 2 
In order to better assess this shift in the components underlying the definitions 
produced by expert participants referring the three concepts to mainly the S & S at workplace 
domain, and those produced by lay participants who referred the three concepts to a variety of 
different domains, a log-linear analysis was performed.  The factors of this analysis were the 
participants (expert participants referring to S & S mainly in one domain vs. lay participants 
referring to S & S in many different domains), the three concepts (‘risk’, ‘danger’ and 
‘prevention’) and the types of components the definitions rested on (situational, introspective, 
taxonomic and attributive).  
On the basis of the test of all marginal and partial associations, the best model that 
fitted the data was obtained (χ2 (d.f. = 12) = 18.133, p = .112). This model highlighted two 
significant interactions.  
The first interaction was between expert participants referring to S&S in one domain 
vs. lay participants referring to S&S in many different domains and the types of the 
components on which the definitions were based  (situational, introspective, taxonomic and 
attributive) (χ2 (d.f. =16) = 35.53, p = .003). This interaction showed the role of situational 
components in the definitions produced by professionals, who referred the concepts to a 
single domain, and the role of introspective components in the definitions produced by non-
professionals, who referred the concepts to a variety of domains. This confirms that non-
professionals refer to more abstract contextual constraints compared to professionals, who 
can ground abstract concepts in a specific domain, the workplace.  
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The other interaction was between expert participants referring to S&S in one domain 
vs. lay participants referring to S&S in many domains and the three concepts (χ2 (d.f. =18) = 
1292.09, p = .0001). It showed that the two samples of participants differed in the 
components used in their definitions of the three concepts, as already highlighted by the 
Correspondence Analyses.  
Professional participants’ definitions, besides overall resting on situational 
components, showed a difference between ‘prevention’, that was characterized by taxonomic 
components, and ‘risk’ and ‘danger’, that were characterized by introspective  and attributive 
components. Non-professional participants’ definitions, instead, presented different 
components depending on the specific concept to be defined. Definitions of the concept 
‘prevention’ were based on situational components, while those of both ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ 
were based on introspective components. In sum, introspective components characterized 
definitions of both experts and students. However, while experts also referred to specific 
situations pertaining their domain of expertise (i.e. their job) plausibly due to the fact they 
were interviewed in their workplace, students referred to taxonomic knowledge and drew 
from a varied pool of experiences (situational components). Introspective components may 
help in drawing the link between the ‘lived’ definitions of these abstract concepts and more 
dictionary-like definitions, which are characteristic of managers and students, who, for 
different reasons, are less bound to refer to one specific situation in their definitions. 
 
General Discussion 
We will outline below the main results concerning the role of situations, the 
importance of expertise and the role of introspection; then we will discuss the implications of 
our results for recent embodied theories of abstract concepts.  
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Situations. Our results clearly show that situational information related to particular 
events and settings plays a prominent role in the definition of the abstract concepts we 
considered. Situations presumably play a major role in grounding them since abstract 
concepts do not have single objects as referents. These results confirm and extend those 
obtained by Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) and Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) to a 
novel domain and with a different task, a definition production one; more generally, they 
support EG theories of cognition. There is a caveat, however: the definition task we used 
does not allow us to determine whether the linguistic production is due to the embodied 
experiences the concepts re-enact or to the different semantic associations evoked by each 
concept. However, we do not see a real opposition between these two accounts, since situated 
and embodied experience could be linguistically encoded (Andrews et al., 2014; Barsalou et 
al., 2008; Louwerse & Connell, 2011).  
Expertise. Our exploratory study shows for the first time how expertise influences 
abstract concepts representation. The definitions produced by experts and non-professionals 
revealed a shift in the abstraction degree of the concepts, due to the activation of different 
components in the two groups. The more fine-grained analyses we performed with the 
different components confirm that definitions of workers and security technicians were more 
influenced than those produced by managers by personal aspects, such as emotions, and by 
more detailed aspects, as the higher percentage of perception elements and of subordinate 
elements suggest. It was as if the three concepts were more concrete for the professionals, 
who grounded them in a single and homogenous domain, than for non-professionals who 
referred them to a great variety of different domains. Thus, the variety of the domains to 
which participants referred in defining abstract concepts influenced the conceptual 
components activated. Focusing on a restricted domain of experience shifted the degree of 
abstractness of concepts toward concreteness in professional participants. This effect matches 
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the effect of expertise in concrete concepts where the basic level becomes more specific with 
expertise (Johnson &  Mervis, 1998; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991).  Overall, this research provides 
for the first time evidence for the interplay between expertise and the information elicited by 
concepts at different degrees of abstractness. First, it enhances our understanding of abstract 
concepts organization providing a detailed analysis on a specific domain. As argued in a 
number of recent studies (Borghi et al., 2014; Ghio et al., 2013; Setti & Caramelli, 2005), 
detailed analyses of the differences between different kinds of abstract concepts are much 
needed. At the same time, our study  also shows how expertise  modulates this organization. 
Our study did not simply provide evidence for a generic effect of expertise on definitions of 
abstract concepts. Also the effect of inter-expert variation, which is well documented in 
objects’ categories (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Johnson, 2001; Medin et al., 1997; Tanaka & 
Taylor, 1991), was found to affect the definitions of abstract concepts. Accordingly, the four 
groups of professionals in Study 1 produced definitions with different components. 
Managers, security-technicians, trade union delegates and workers referred to the domain of 
S&S at the workplaces from different perspectives, like ‘ideals’ (Barsalou, 1985) or ‘theories’ 
(Murphy & Medin, 1985), as it happens in objects’ concepts. In fact, both managers and 
security-technicians, who have declarative knowledge implying concrete contextual 
constraints, as those provided by norms and rules in the S&S domain, produced definitions 
based on taxonomies. Instead, workers and trade union delegates, likely to have been workers 
at a previous stage, produced definitions based on introspection implying the more abstract, 
generic contextual constraints of the risky and dangerous situations they directly experienced. 
Introspection. Taken together the present results suggest that concepts are rated as 
more abstract when they are more difficult to ground in a specific context. In line with the 
Contextual Constraint Theory (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001), the more abstract a concept is 
rated, the more abstract the contextual constraints it activates. Importantly, an increase of 
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abstractness is related to an increase of introspective components, in line with predictions of 
WAT and partially of AEA.  
Which theory? Overall, we found that abstract concepts are grounded in situations,  
activate introspective components, and are modulated by expertise. These findings are 
difficult to accommodate with traditional views such as the Context Availability Theory, 
according to which abstract concepts are only loosely related to their context 
(Schwanenflugel etal., 1988), and the Dual Coding Theory, according to which abstract 
concepts activate verbal information, while concrete ones activate imagery (Paivio, 1986). 
Our results can be more easily explained by theories proposing that abstract and concrete 
concepts differ as to their organizational principles, but are embodied (Dove, 2011; Borghi et 
al., 2011; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Crutch & Warrington, 2005).  
Overall, the fact that abstract concepts are grounded in situations and modulated by 
expertise clearly supports EG theories in general, even if it does not provide direct support 
neither to the conceptual metaphor theory nor to the action-based view. The role played by 
introspective properties allows further insight into which theory may best fit the results.  
The situation and introspective view can easily account for the results, since the level 
of abstractness is predicted by the looser contextual constraints and by the higher number of 
introspective components. AEA could explain the importance of introspective components 
arguing that abstract concepts activate emotional aspects; consider, however, that this 
explanation would be only partial since emotional features represent only a subset of the 
introspective components.  
Our results support also WAT, according to which abstract concepts are embodied 
and activate linguistic information: we namely found that abstract concepts are grounded, 
because they largely activate situations and are modulated by expertise, and also activate 
introspective information. In the framework of the WAT proposal, introspective relations can 
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be interpreted as explanations of concepts to oneself, likely mediated by inner talk. 
Introspective components may highlight the need to relate grounded definitions to a more 
normative definition (dictionary-like) which can comprise different contexts, more so for 
workers and delegates whose definitions are more grounded in one specific situation. Since 
introspective components were found to play a strong role also in property generation tasks 
(Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Roversi et al., 2013), we think it can be excluded that 
the role for introspection is stronger here because of the expectancy of what a definition 
should be like. Further research is needed in order to understand more deeply the role played 
by introspective elements in characterizing the most abstract among abstract concepts. 
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